AN APPENDIX TO THE REVIEW OF Mr. PITT's ADMINISTRATION.

BY

The AUTHOR of the REVIEW.

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THERE are a few words wanting, as well to refute ſome particular charges lately brought againſt Mr. Pitt, as to do juſtice to his glorious and immortal adminiſtration, which it is the deſign of this Appendix to ſupply. As it is impoſſible to convey theſe pages into the hands of the purchaſers of the ſeveral editions of the Review, by adding them to a new one, the faireſt method of publication ſeems to be that of a *ſeparate* one; ſo that thoſe who are poſſeſſed of *any* edition of the Review, may, if they think proper, add the Appendix to it; which, for that purpoſe, is printed in exactly the ſame ſize and manner.

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An APPENDIX, &c.

IT has been already mentioned in the Review, that Mr. Pitt was appointed ſecretary of ſtate in December 1756, and in April following was ordered to reſign: but the cauſe of that reſignation is not mentioned in the Review, nor was perhaps a true ſtate of the affair ever laid before the public. Therefore it may not be amiſs to add here a few lines upon the ſubject.

A ſyſtem of the moſt extenſive and extravagant continental connections, in which there was the moſt evident marks of profound ignorance and unpardonable folly, was formed during the adminiſtration of Mr. Fox. Mr. Pitt in a very nervous and bold manner oppoſed that ſyſtem. The loſs of Minorca drove Mr. Fox from the ſtate; and the neceſſity of affairs brought in Mr. Pitt. But ſtill Mr. Pitt oppoſed this ſyſtem of German connections. Early in 1756, (at which time Mr. Pitt was ſecretary of ſtate) it was known to all Europe, that the French would march a great army againſt Hanover, as ſoon as the ſeaſon would permit the troops to take the field. That Hanover *muſt* be defended was reaſonable; becauſe the French attacked it for no other reaſon but the animoſity they bore to the king of England. But the method, or rather, the plan of this defence, was what Mr. Pitt objected to. A ſubſidy treaty had been made with Heſſe, and another with Ruſſia. Thoſe who made theſe treaties, finding their meaſures very unpopular at home, attempted to impoſe on the people a notion, that theſe treaties were made for

the defence of Britain.* This was ſo abſurd and ſo ridiculous, that both the treaties and the makers, became the jeſt of almoſt every man in England. The true meaning of the treaty with Ruſſia, if any meaning it had, was the defence of Hanover. But to mend the matter, becauſe every man ſaw the meaſure was fooliſh, a convention was made with Pruſſia; and by that, the treaty with Ruſſia rendered void; for the convention ſtipulated, that the contracting powers were to keep *all* foreign troops out of the empire; and the Ruſſians were foreign troops. Unfortunately too, at this time the grand alliance was formed againſt the king of

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* As the miniſters who made them endeavoured to repreſent them as inſtances of the moſt conſummate wiſdom and policy, and the moſt active care of the public welfare, it may not be amiſs to quote a few lines of remarks which were made on them. "What honours our miniſters and negociators may expect to be paid to their wiſdom it is hard to determine, for the demands of vanity are not eaſily eſtimated. They ſhould conſider, before they call too loudly for encomiums, that they live in an age when the power of gold is no longer a ſecret, and in which no man finds much difficulty in making a bargain with money in his hand. To hire troops is very eaſy to thoſe who will pay their price. It appears that whatever has been done, was done by means which every man knows how to uſe, if fortune is kind enough to put them in his power." *No man in England ever underſtood the Court Kalendar ſo well as Mr. Fox.* Whether this gentleman is indebted to any plan or maxim of Mr. Winnington's, a well known predeceſſor of his, in the office of paymaſter, for his knowledge of the *little red book*, is impoſſible to tell; but it is certain, that Mr. Winnington was reckoned to be as well ſkilled in it as any man of his time; and it was doubtleſs his *thorough acquaintance* of it, that induced him, one morning to tell the late Earl Granville, whom he found reading Demoſthenes, (of which his lordſhip was remarkably fond) "that he was ſtudying his *ruin*"; and, pulling the *red book* out of his pocket, added, "*that* was what he ought to *ſtudy*." The paymaſter's words were not far from truth; for his lordſhip being unſkilled in the arts of corruption, never made a fortune by his employments.

Pruſſia;

Pruſſia; ſo that he could not, nay it could not be expected that he ſhould, aſſiſt in the defence of Hanover, unleſs ſome adequate equivalent was ſtipulated for him, which the convention did not do. Thus either way, was Hanover left almoſt defenceleſs, as the event afterwards proved; and England paying Hanoverian and Heſſian forces to no purpoſe. Mr Fox, however, plumed himſelf much upon the ſyſtem which he had formed. The Hanoverian and Heſſian troops were collected together, and ſtiled an army of obſervation: *i. e.* they were to obſerve the motions of a French army twice their number, which would ſhortly march againſt Hanover. His royal highneſs the duke of Cumberland was appointed commander of this army of obſervation. None objected to his royal highneſs as an able and brave commander; but almoſt every one lamented, that he was to be ſent on ſo weak and unſerviceable a ſyſtem. Mr. Pitt utterly condemned it as ſuch; and all honeſt men, who had their eyes open, concurred in that opinion. Mr Fox ſtill perſiſted to affirm it a good one; a parliament to his wiſhes, gave their approbation to it, by voting the money required for it; and he determined to force the execution. The firſt ſtep to which, Mr. Pitt and his friends muſt be driven from the ſtate, becauſe they oppoſed it. The ſtorm firſt fell on lord Temple, who, when Mr. Pitt was appointed ſecretary of ſtate, was appointed firſt lord of the admiralty. He was diſmiſſed; not as it ſhould ſeem on account of any part of his conduct, which was truly fair and unreproachable, but on a mere perſonality. A little after, when matters were more ripe, Mr. Legge, chancellor of the exchequer, appointed at the ſame time with lord Temple, was diſmiſſed; and laſtly, Mr. Pitt, by his majeſty's command, reſigned the ſeals of ſecretary of ſtate for the ſouth-

ern department. Four days after Mr. Pitt reſigned the duke of Cumberland ſet out for Germany. The maſk was now pulled off, with reſpect to what Mr. Fox aimed at, who at that time expreſſed the ſtrongeſt attachment, as well as gratitude, to his great benefactor, the duke of Cumberland: it was a clear ſtage of all thoſe who oppoſed *his* continental ſyſtem before the duke ſet out. This is the plain fact. The army of obſervation *then* took the field, and meaſures for the defence of Hanover were *then* ſettled; or rather *fixed* in ſuch a manner as that no future miniſter ſhould alter them. The three diſtinguiſhed perſonages juſt mentioned, were, in particular, repreſented to his majeſty as unfit for any employment, and as alienated from his perſon and ſervice: nor is it at all improbable, that his majeſty was for ſome time deceived into this opinion, for many good kings have been deceived and impoſed upon by wicked miniſters: but nothing is more true, than that he was afterwards undeceived, and that he found them to be the beſt friends to his perſon, his family and his people, he ever had experienced; nor did he fail to reward the noble lord, againſt whoſe honeſty, ability and integrity, no objection had been, nor could be made, with the moſt gracious marks of his favour.

The principal fault which Mr. Pitt's enemies find with him, is, as they phraſe it, his firſt oppoſing the German war, and then his acquieſcing in it. This has been called "a heap of contradictions." The hired advocates of lord Bute's œconomical plans and meaſures, and thoſe who lent, or more properly, ſold themſelves to his ſupport, have exhauſted not only all their own, but even the little abſurd rhetoric of their patrons, on this topic.

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They have declaimed with violence and virulence againſt Mr. Pitt on this point. There is not perhaps a man in the three kingdoms who has been more abuſed, vilified and libelled, in both his private and public character*; nor have thoſe who eſpouſed

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* Every man of candour and moderation, to whom, in fact, all parties appeal, has been ſorry to ſee the virulence, ſcurrilities, perſonalities, and abuſe, of thoſe who undertook to defend the adminiſtration: and equally ſorry has he been, to ſee the ſame licentiouſneſs practiſed by thoſe who defend the oppoſition. There is a way it is granted of appealing to mens paſſions without the infamous aſſiſtance of ſlander. All writers, however, are not ſo happy as to attain it. But as this licentiouſneſs, this truly deteſtable practice, has been uſed by the miniſtry, ought the miniſtry to complain, if it is retorted upon them? They began the ſcurrility. As there is not perhaps a perſon of note either in, or belonging to the miniſtry, who has not in ſome meaſure, or by ſome means or other, contributed towards it, ought any perſon either in, or belonging to the miniſtry, to think himſelf hardly dealt by, if others treat him as he treats others? That adminiſtration, or indeed that perſon belonging to it, that cannot be defended from ſuch like abuſe as hath practiſed in the preſent diſpute, without having recourſe to law, is not fit to ſtand in a free country. Any attack upon the liberty of the preſs by either party, or any perſon ſtirred up by either party. ſince *both* parties have, in an equal degree, abuſed this liberty, is ſure to hurt the reputation of that party which does it, with the people. The people are now very tenacious of the liberty of the preſs. They are very ſtrongly ſenſible that, next to an honeſt and able Jury, who will always deteſt and abhor any *encroachments* on their juſt rights, by any perſon whatſoever, it is the only valuable liberty they have now left. Perhaps there is no man perſonally and privately who has been more abuſed and ſlandered than Mr. Pitt, yet with a dignity and noble ſpirit truely becoming himſelf, he overlooks all ſuch malicious efforts. He ſcorns to take refuge in the law, becauſe it would be cowardly; and not only he, but all his friends have ſhewn, that they truſt their cauſe to the public at large, and leave every man at full liberty to form his own opinion on their merits and demerits. Can the miniſters, and ALL their partizans ſay as much? no they cannot. If they do, proof ſhall be given of the contrary. Who then are friends to the liberties of the people, and above all, to that invaluable bleſſing the liberty of the preſs? — Who

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eſpouſed his honeſt and patriotic ſentiments, been in the leaſt excluded from the ſame kind of treatment.

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are ſo tenacious of this great liberty, that though they themſelves are touched by it, yet they will not invade it becauſe of the people? —— " It is not ſo much the debarring us of the na-
" tural uſe of our tongue, that can tend to the ſecurity of a
" temporary and tottering adminiſtration, as the effectually
" putting an entire ſtop to the communication of our ſentiments
" in print; which, in caſes of danger, has ever had the good
" effect of alarming the people in general, with a ſenſe and
" knowledge of that danger, and thereby they have been enabled
" to put themſelves on their defence, and make head againſt
" ſuch attacks: but ſhould this liberty be deſtroyed, there will
" inſtantly be an end of every other; for this is the great bul-
" wark which ſupports all the reſt. It is too viſible to be con-
" cealed, and it is too true to be denied, that there have lately been
" ſeveral attempts made to accompliſh it. They have hitherto
" failed. But as this is a point which weak and wicked miniſt-
" ers have inceſſantly laboured at, the people muſt continue
" to be watchful over it, leſt a time ſhould come when a miniſt-
" ry, afraid of their own conduct, or any part of it, being ar-
" gued or reaſon'd upon before the public, ſhall have made
" ſuch large ſtrides towards deſpotic power, as to ſteal this in-
" eſtimable jewel out of the hands of the people. No honeſt
" miniſter will ever ſhew a deſire of wounding this great and
" only barrier of the liberties of this free country. We have
" only to fear ſuch attacks from miniſters who are afraid their
" actions ſhould ſee the light, and who will therefore be eter-
" nally promoting, publickly or privately, perſecutions againſt
" authors, printers, and publiſhers, in order to put a ſtop to
" this liberty. . . . Every one has obſerved, how often the
" miniſterial champions have endeavoured to diffuſe the terror
" of the laws amongſt the honeſt and ſenſible part of the peo-
" ple, who will preſume to judge for themſelves and conſe-
" quently diſſent from their falſe reaſonings and infamous fal-
" lacies. If it could be ſuppoſed that theſe writers give us the
" language and ſentiments of their maſters, it will follow, that
" the deſign of attacking our liberties is not far diſtant; for
" they have repeatedly talked of fines, pillories, and goals,
" and other tyrannic proceedings, ſuch as were practiſed by the
" ever odious and unconſtitutional ſtar-chamber; and, when
" they have found themſelves over matched in point of abilities,
" they have gone ſo far as to even threaten ſuch of their anta-
" goniſts with theſe kinds of puniſhment, hoping thereby to
" ſilence them. But this ſort of language has had no other ef-

" fect

ment. But in no inſtance have the public been more abuſed, nor have ſo many falſities been raiſed and propagated, with reſpect to Mr. Pitt's conduct, as concerning this point. It is granted that Mr. Pitt has oppoſed continental connections; it is granted in its full extent, together with every thing that he *really did ſay*. But when did he oppoſe continental connections *in general*, and aſſert that we ought to have *no* connections with the continent? The tools of a temporary and tottering adminiſtration cannot inform the public. They cannot ſhew that he ever endeavoured to prove we ought to renounce *all* connections with the continent. He was ſenſible, and no man more ſo, that while there are ſo many great powers on the continent, purſuing their reſpective intereſts, which are occaſionally oppoſed to, or connected with thoſe of Great Britain, it is impoſſible we ſhould be *entirely* ſeperated from the continent †. Therefore what

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" fect than convincing us of their own arbitrary principles and " ſecret inclinations." *Vide the Letter to the Right Hon. George Grenville.*

† It may not be improper to obſerve here, that ſome of the wiſeſt counſellors that ever were in this country, ſaw that we could not be totally diſengaged from the continent, while there are powers on the continent, who are natural and very dangerous enemies to us. To inſtance only queen Elizabeth's counſellors, we ſhall find that they thought it neceſſary to adviſe that great princeſs, who knew how to chuſe good counſellors as well, if not better, than any prince that ever reig ed in this country, to aſſiſt Holland to caſt off the Spaniſh yoke. Spain was then the natural enemy of England, in the ſame manner that France now is. Elizabeth therefore entered into this meaſure, becauſe it was for the intereſt and ſafety of her people to oppoſe any aggrandizement of Spain. She not only ſent troops, but even money to the Dutch; and yet ſhe never was ſaid to ſquander away the blood and treaſures of her kingdom in foreign quarrels, or diſputes which were none of her own. On the contrary the character which ſhe bears upon record, is that of a truly excellent and admirable princeſs, who ſincerely

what he blamed, and what he only blamed, during all the time he oppoſed German meaſures, was

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ſincerely loved her people, and poſſeſſed an uncommon ſhare of real ſound ſenſe and good parts. From the character that is given her by all honeſt hiſtorians, we may be aſſured, that ſhe would not enter into a meaſure that was utterly unſerviceable to the intereſts of her people. Yet great and good as this princeſs was, high as ſhe was in the eſtimation of her people, and the power of her kingdom tremendous, ſhe was not free from enemies. The little, narrow minded, ſelf intereſted, hypocritical, tyrannical Scots abhorred her, as they do every thing that is open, generous and honeſt; and the Stuarts and Jacobites do to this day deteſt her memory. The Scottiſh writers will not allow *her* any merit: the glories of her reign, and the happineſs of her people, they give to her *miniſters*, becauſe they cannot obliterate them. This is contrary to the uſual practice of Scotſmen, whoſe principles being naturally arbitrary, commonly aſcribe every act of power to the king, in order, by hat means, to exclude any canvaſs upon it. But this deviation from their general maxim, is not at all to be wondered at, if we conſider their *true* character, which is that of a time-ſerving, ſycophant, tyrannical, deceitful people. Yet the propriety of their aſcribing the glories of Elizabeth's reign to the wiſdom of her counſellors *only*, will be ſeen by the following anecdote. "' King James the ſecond ordered the earl of Sunderland to bring Waller, the poet, to him one afternoon. When he came the king carried him into his cloſet, and there aſked him ' how he liked ſuch a picture.' ' Sir, ſaid Mr. Waller, my eyes are dim; I do not know whoſe it is.' The king anſwered, ' it is the princeſs of Orange,' ' Then, ſaid Mr. Waller, ſhe is like the greateſt princeſs in the world.' ' Whom do you call ſo,' aſked the king. ' Queen Elizabeth' ſaid he. ' I wonder, Mr. Waller, replied the king, you ſhould think ſo; but I muſt confeſs ſhe had a wiſe council' ' And, ſir, ſaid Mr. Waller, did your majeſty ever know a *fool* chuſe a wiſe one.'—Such as were enemies to the glory, intereſt and liberty of their country, were enemies to Elizabeth. She has been repreſented by them, as haughty and overbearing. But they could never impeach her wiſdom, or her honeſty; or ſhew when the power of England was ſo formidable and reſpectable as in her time. They could never deny that ſhe made the intereſt and happineſs of her people her greateſt glory; nor that every power in Europe was afraid of her. If ſhe had not been a princeſs of that ſpirit, wiſdom and fortitude; but a tame, weak, docile creature, who left the buſineſs of her kingdom to ſuch miniſters as her fancy, not her people

was, A PARTICULAR SYSTEM. A ſyſtem, which not he alone, but a great number of other honeſt men, ſaw was injurious to the intereſts of England. A plan, or rather a meaſure without a plan, purſued by miniſters who wanted ability, or honeſty, or ſometimes both, to ſerve their country, was what he oppoſed. It was a connexion with Germany, purely to ſerve Germany *only*: ſuch a connexion as neither did, nor could in any manner, ſerve this country. For inſtance, let it be aſked, did we ever receive any advantage from our alliance with the empreſs queen, who by Mr. Pitt's ſucceſſors, is called the *natural ally* of England? Did not we maintain a great army in Flanders, in ſupport of her cauſe; and notwithſtanding all the efforts of our then miniſtry, did we prevent the French gaining

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people approved; would any power have been afraid of us? The truth is, ſhe had wiſdom to chuſe ſuch good counſellors as were both honeſt and able to purſue the intereſt of their country, and thereby made the power of her kingdom great and reſpectable, and her people completely happy.---Such men, for ſuch there are, as were enemies to Elizabeth, are now enemies to Mr. Pitt. He may be ſaid to have, in ſome meaſure, ſuch ſpirit as Elizabeth: he is tenacious of the glory of his country; will not ſee its intereſt injured; will brook with no affronts from foreign powers. His pride therefore is a virtue; it is a high ſenſe of the power and dignity of his own country. In a word, he is a ſpirited, true, honeſt, open-hearted, Engliſhman. He entered into continental meaſures upon the ſame principle as Elizabeth did. France was our natural, and will be our eternal enemy. Mr. Pitt's ſyſtem was therefore right to diſtreſs her by *every* means, in *every* part, and in *every* place, becauſe it is for our intereſt and ſafety ſo to do. If in the late war we had fought France *only* by ſea, we ſhould not have diſtreſſed her half ſo much. A conſiderable part of our great fleet muſt have been unemployed, for the French would have kept out of our way, and out of our power to get at them. That our continental engagements have facilitated our conqueſts in America, and thereby diſtreſſed France a double way, is moſt certain. We will inſtance only the conqueſt of Canada. Had the attention of the French not been diverted, in Germany, (for a diverſion it was, notwithſtanding

gaining poſſeſſion of thoſe places the allies attempted to defend? Did not we give up Louiſbourgh, a conqueſt made by Britons *only*, in order to reſtore her to the Netherlands, which France had taken? Did not ſhe afterwards repay us for the moſt unbounded acts of generoſity and friendſhip, with the moſt ſcandalous act of ingratitude, at the beginning of the late war? *This* was one of the ſyſtems which Mr. Pitt ſo long and ſo vehemently oppoſed The *other* was, that already mentioned, as formed during the adminiſtration of Mr. Fox. By this ſyſtem we were to hire troops in the polar circle, and bring them down for the defence of Hanover. Could there be any continental ſyſtem more *extenſive*, ſo madly profuſe, and to ſuch little purpoſe. England was not only going to defend Hanover againſt the great land power of France,

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ſtanding all the ſophiſtry of Mr. Mauduit; as it can be proved that it coſt France more than England) it muſt conſequently have been *wholly* employed on the protection of their iſlands and colonies. Now it is known to ſome of the principal inſtruments employed in the reduction of Canada, that had the Canadians received but a little more aſſiſtance from France than they did, our deſign would have been entirely fruſtrated. The expedition would have miſcarried, and the conſequence at home would have been, what that truly brave and amiable hero, general Wolfe, moſt dreaded, clamour and diſgrace; although, perhaps, the officers and men might have done all that was in their power to do.—Honeſt men, therefore, who are ſincere friends to his majeſty and their country, will not vilify and abuſe a man, who has ſerved his country ſo well, ſo honeſtly, and ſo glorioufly, as Mr. Pitt. Did any other miniſter ever do as much? Before we blame the extenſiveneſs of his plans, we ſhould conſider the extenſiveneſs of his victories; that by them he humbled a kingdom, more than twice as powerful as ourſelves, in its number of men. Before we find fault with the expence, we ſhould reflect on the bankruptcy of France, the diſgrace of it; and remember, that during *his* adminiſtration, notwithſtanding it was a time of war, TRADE and COMMERCE, the ſinews of Britain, flouriſhed and encreaſed more than ever they did before, or ſince.

France, but Pruſſia, or the German body, or *any* body: and to do this, ſhe hired the great empire of Ruſſia. The wiſdom and policy of this extenſive and extravagant ſyſtem, deſerve no mention. It is a compliment to the then miniſter, not to call them in queſtion; but it is proper to add, that it was a bleſſing to England, it did not take place. Upon the ruin of this, which was defended until it became utterly indefenſible, another was formed, which Mr. Pitt, agreeable to the wiſhes of the nation, at length adopted and improved, ſo as to become both ſerviceable to England, and effectual for the defence of Hanover.

Mr. Pitt was not the only man who ſaw the miſchiefs, and even ruinous meaſures, which thoſe two ſyſtems he ſo ſtrongly oppoſed, would inevitably bring on; for there were a great number of other honeſt, able, and worthy men, who ſaw them in the ſame light, and therefore oppoſed them upon the ſame motives. But neither he, nor thoſe who joined in that oppoſition, ever ſaid, that England ought to be *entirely* freed from *all* connexions with the continent. On the contrary, they were firmly of this revolution principle, that ſuch a continental ſyſtem might be formed, as would not only check the ambition of the houſe of Bourbon at home, but be the means of furniſhing opportunities, for both cutting off her trade, and ſtripping her of her moſt valuable ſettlements abroad. If France is affected, England is ſerved; for England always receives an advantage, when France receives a wound: and on the contrary, if France gains any material addition of power, it is dangerous to the ſafety of England. But did the continental ſyſtem, formed in 1743, give France a wound? No man will be hardy enough to ſay it did. Did the *other* continental ſyſtem, formed in 1755, in the leaſt affect France? It is well known, that the ſucceſſes of the

French arms continued in both America and Germany, with the moſt alarming rapidity, until Mr. Pitt was allowed to direct the affairs of this country; and until, at the expreſs deſire of the whole kingdom, he embarked in the continental meaſures; he by his own wiſdom, aſſiduity, and vigilance, moulded them into an uniform ſyſtem, which he conducted in ſo able and ſpirited a manner, as to render it ſerviceable to both Germany and Britain. *Then*, THOSE who had oppoſed the German meaſures, as long and as vehemently as Mr. Pitt, *acquieſced* in a ſyſtem, which they ſaw calculated to ſerve their country, becauſe it would *diſtreſs* and *perplex* France. Were all thoſe perſons who had oppoſed the continental connections made by other miniſters, and afterwards acquieſced in Mr. Pitt's ſyſtem, *an heap of contradictions?* Were the WHOLE PEOPLE, parliament and all, *an heap of contradictions?* Was Leiceſter-Houſe, which gave its approbation to the treaty with Pruſſia, made during Mr. Pitt's adminiſtration, *an heap of contradictions?* What Mr. Pitt's ſyſtem was, has already been explained in the Review, therefore it would be impertinent to repeat it here. But it may not be improper to add, that by *his* ſyſtem all our conqueſts were made; and the French were ſo effectually defeated in all their attempts to ſeize Hanover, that if his late majeſty *had* lived to have ſeen an end of the war, that electorate would not have been to be purchaſed with any of the Britiſh conqueſts. Nay, ſo greatly were the French diſtreſſed, and ruined by *his* ſyſtem, that they could not even keep their footing in Germany; and notwithſtanding the allied army, after he was driven from the ſtate, received no ſort of aſſiſtance, encouragement, or reinforcement from England, during lord Bute's adminiſtration, yet that miniſter, who, in order to get a peace at *any* rate, had intended to totally abandon

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all our allies on the continent, could not hinder prince Ferdinand from taking Caſſel, and thereby deſtroying the fruits of all the victories the French had boaſted of: ſo well was Mr. Pitt's ſyſtem calculated to ſerve *both* Germany and England: therefore England, ſo far from loſing by her connexions with Germany, as in former wars, gained by Mr. Pitt's ſyſtem; and the French were defeated there, as well as every where elſe.

Although in the war of 1743, England gained no particular advantage by her connexions with the continent, becauſe that, as well as ſeveral other parts of the war, were conducted upon a wrong ſyſtem, and in an unſkilful manner; yet, as Mr. Pitt very juſtly obſerved, it had always been found political, except in the four unhappy reigns of the Stuarts, for England to have connexions with the continent. If for inſtance, in the late war, when Spain took part againſt us, the opinion had been agreed to, which was founded, that we ought to withdraw our troops from Germany, otherwiſe we ſhould not be able to ſupport Portugal; then the Low Countries would have become a prey to the French and Spaniards; and will any man ſay, that *ſuch* a valuable addition of wealth and power to the ambitious houſe of Bourbon, ought not reaſonably to alarm England? Thoſe ſurely who adopted that opinion, forgot national ſafety, as well as national honour, which was ſtaked for the defence of Hanover, a country ſuffering *entirely* on our account. Queen Elizabeth did not think it good policy to let Spain, her *ſingle* enemy, have the Netherlands: ſhe thought ſuch an aggrandizement to her enemy, endangered the ſafety of her people. Would it, therefore, have been policy in us, to let the Low Countries fall a prey to *both* France and Spain? Is not our ſafety the more endangered as they grow the more powerful?

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The only good objection which has been made to the German war, is the expence of it. Somewhere there is doubtleſs a great fault, and it is proper that the public ſhould know where to fix it juſtly; for thoſe who have made free with the public money, ought to be anſwerable to the public for it. But until an enquiry of this ſort is made, it is wrong to fix the blame any where: yet it is neceſſary in theſe pages, to do juſtice to the illuſtrious character which the title declares them to concern. In moſt of the ſcurrility and abuſe on Mr. Pitt, there is to be found ſomething relating to the expence of the German war; ſometimes abſolutely imputing it to him, and always at leaſt inſinuating it; as if *he* ought to be blamed for any miſapplication of money. Now it is known to every perſon, who is in the leaſt acquained with our government, that Mr. Pitt, in his miniſterial capacity, and in no other he could or did act, had nothing to do with the expence; that, that is an article abſolutely and ſeparately belonging to *another* department; which in ſuch caſes is entirely independent of the ſecretary of ſtate's office. Mr. Pitt had to plan, and draw the great out line of the operations. If any fault has been committed *there*, he becomes truly chargeable; but none has been committed: and becauſe his enemies cannot find any fault, that really *does* belong to him as a miniſter, they have attempted to poiſon the minds of the people with a fault, that muſt, in juſtice, be laid *ſome where elſe*. As an inconteſtible proof of his honeſty and *open* dealings, of the ſoundneſs of his heart and the cleaneſs of his hands, he can hold up his fingers, and tell his enemies, *that no money ſticks to them*. If there has not been fair play with the money, there is not a man in England that is more ready to ſecond a motion for an enquiry into the money affairs. There is not a man in England

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that is more deſirous of knowing how the money has been applied; nor one that is more willing that the WHOLE TRUTH ſhould come to light. Can his enemies, and they who were concerned in that great work, the peace, ſay as much? would *he* be ſo ready, if his own conſcious heart did not tell him he was entirely free from blemiſh?

It was unjuſt in his enemies, and ſhewed they had little friendſhip for their country, though they boaſted of a great deal, to endeavour to repreſent our condition as truly deplorable, poor and helpleſs; to ſay that we were exhauſted, that we had neither men nor money to carry on the war, that we were ruined, and that the French *muſt infallibly* come off victorious, if we continued the war another year. Such language is more like that of traitors, than friends to their country: but it is no wonder that Scotchmen ſhould uſe it, for two reaſons; one, becauſe their great chief adobted it; and another, becauſe Scotland is the *ancient*, and has been commonly ſtiled, the *natural ally* of France. There needs no arguments to prove that both the foreign and domiſtic affairs of this kingdom were in a very flouriſhing condition during Mr. Pitt's adminiſtration; more ſo than they were before, or have been ſince; becauſe every man is convinced of the truth of it. And what is equally true, and what theſe enemies of their country (for ſo they ought to be called) paſs unnoticed, is, that the immenſe advantages gained to our trade, by the ſucceſs of our arms, while Mr. Pitt was ſuffered to be miniſter, more than compenſated for the great expence of the war. England therefore was never better able to ſupport a war: nor were the people ever more willing to ſupport a miniſter, becauſe they could confide in him, they knew him to be honeſt, faithful, and worthy of the truſt repoſed in him; therefore, whatever had been the exigencies of the ſtate, they would

would have been chearfully ſupplied. We all know that the war might have been continued longer, and that a better, and a much better peace, might have been made: why *that* was not done, which is the end of going to war, thoſe ought to be accountable, who have thereby *ſacrificed* the intereſt of the nation, and almoſt *reinſtated* our bankrupt enemy.

The world is much abuſed in that part of Mr. Pitt's conduct, relative to his oppoſition to, and acquieſcence in German meaſures. The hired advocates, the ſlaves and abettors of a corrupt and incapable adminiſtration, have falſified his conduct in the moſt unfair and infamous manner. They have endeavoured to repreſent him as inconſiſtent; and as a proof of inconſiſtency, they tell a falſe tale of his oppoſing the German meaſures, and then acquieſcing in them; but they omit, that he oppoſed *weak* and *ruinous* ſyſtems; that when he came into power *he found us in Germany*, and that he could not totally diſengage us from ſome of thoſe meaſures which their patrons had taken. Every one knows that Mr. Pitt did not enter into continental connexions until the nation were unanimous in their deſire of it. Therefore it is more the nation's meaſure than Mr. Pitt's. This humour of the nation was in conſequence of the battle of Roſbach. If that victory had not happeded, the Hanoverians would not have reſumed their arms, nor England of courſe at the expence of ſupporting them. All that Mr. Pitt, or the moſt able miniſter in ſuch circumſtances could do, was, to ſettle and adjuſt an uniform ſyſtem upon thoſe meaſures, or the wiſeſt part of them, in which *he found us* engaged, and by purſuing regular plans, laid down upon the principal of diſtreſſing the enemy, bring that ſyſtem to be thereby ſerviceable to England, as well as to Germany.

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The unparallelled, glorious, and immortal ſucceſſes of our arms, during Mr. Pitt's adminiſtration, are alone ſufficient proofs, that by every great meaſure which he undertook he ſerved his country. The benefit of his ſyſtem, both we and our poſterity would have felt, if he had been permitted to ſerve his country to the concluſion of the war, in the ſame honeſt and glorious manner that he did during the continuance of it. In Mr. Pitt's continental ſyſtem the late miniſter himſelf acquieſced; but as ſoon as the breath was out of his late majeſty's body, his own ambition for power, not any regard for his country, prompted him to oppoſe it. The very alliance which he himſelf approved, he treacherouſly broke.

By this explanation of Mr. Pitt's conduct, relative to German meaſures, the public will be, in ſome meaſure, enabled to judge of the truth and candour of thoſe who have attempted to defend the miniſtry, at the expence of the reputation, if they could injure it, of a man, who has ſerved his country with unparallelled aſſiduity, integrity, glory and ſpirit; and how far thoſe writers, and retailers of falſities and ſcandal, are to be credited, with reſpect to their other* articles of defamation.

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* Among the number of falſe and idle tales which have been propagated, reſpecting Mr. Pitt, it is juſt neceſſary to mention one, becauſe it concerns many perſons, and many perſons have been deceived by it. It has been ſaid, that the king of Portugal had violated the treaty relative to the Engliſh merchants in the wine trade, and that a complaint of ſuch violation was tranſmitted to Mr. Pitt, *who never attended to it.* This latter aſſertion is directly falſe: Mr. Pitt was ſo far from *not* attending to it, that he actually ſpent ſeveral nights on the ſubject: nor was the complaint laid aſide, until every allegation in it, was, upon the ſtricteſt and minuteſt examination, found to be falſe and groundleſs. Thoſe who particularly intereſted

 themſelves

The projectors of the exciſe tax upon cyder, have laid great ſtreſs on a part of Mr. Pitt's conduct relative to a tax upon beer, which was levied during his adminiſtration. Had the exciſe on cyder not taken place, it is probable the tax upon beer would not have been repeatedly repreſented by the defenders of Mr. George Grenville's adminiſtration, as an odious and oppreſſive tax, "*cruelly wrung from the briny ſweat of induſtry.*" But the reaſon of its being ſo held out to the public, is to palliate for that *more* odious, *more* oppreſſive tax on cyder; in order to attempt to ſhew, that the miniſtry, which ſucceeded Mr. Pitt, have not *extended* oppreſſion, though they have enlarged the exciſe. This is the beſt excuſe they can offer for the exciſe on cyder. Yet they will not allow Mr. Pitt to have any merit. Every thing which he did, they ſay, was wrong: and when they come to vindicate their own patrons, or as it ſhould rather ſeem, (for many ſilly pieces, which have been lately publiſhed, have the appearance of authority) when the miniſters come to vindicate and compliment themſelves, they ſay, "they have done no *worſe* than Mr. Pitt did." Strange! that men, who will not allow any thing but *faults* in Mr. Pitt, ſhould think to acquire the good opinion of their countrymen, by pretending *to have committed no worſe faults.* But the truth is, they know that Mr. Pitt's reputation, and his ſervices, are engraven

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themſelves in this affair, were referred to what paſſed between Mr. Pitt and the Portugueſe ambaſſador in London, on the ſubject, in order that they might convince themſelves, that Mr. Pitt *did attend* to the complaint.—A thouſand of ſuch like tales might be brought and refuted: but it is needleſs; the impartial public already do juſtice to his honeſt and upright conduct; by believing he did *more* than any *other* miniſter *ever did*; and to the end of his glorious adminiſtration, *all* that he was permitted.

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in the hearts of his fellow ſubjects, who do, and ever will, retain an high and juſt ſenſe of his ſpirit, honeſty, integrity, and wiſdom; and above all, a moſt grateful remembrance of the immortal glories of his adminiſtration. The very high eſteem therefore, in which Mr. Pitt is held by his countrymen, is the reaſon that the ſucceeding candidates for popularity have ſaid, they have done no *worſe* than Mr. Pitt; and that Mr. Pitt oppoſed a tax, not more odious or oppreſſive than one he himſelf had levied. The truth of theſe aſſertions is to be examined. When Mr. Pitt ſupported the bill in the houſe of commons for the tax upon beer, there could not *then* be a better tax contrived, that was at the ſame time *adequate* to the ſupplies, for there was an intention among the brewers to impoſe it, if the parliament had not. Therefore the charge on Mr. Pitt, that he levied it, will redound to his honour; for the ſame additional money would have been *cruelly wrung from the briny ſweat of induſtry* if he had not been miniſter; but it was certainly moſt politic in him, and it was certainly moſt ſerviceable to the nation in general, to ſtrengthen the ſtate, in order to humble a natural and implacable enemy, with what a few individuals had intended to enrich themſelves.† It muſt be acknowledged of this tax, that few, if any others ſo advantageous to the ſtate

† If a head ſo formed for the *diſpatch* of buſineſs, ſo *wiſe* and ſo *plodding*, as that of Mr. George Grenville, had been in the lead of the adminiſtration, he would probable have found out ſome *other* tax upon the induſtrious, and have ſuffered the brewers to levy theirs with impunity. Thus would the poor and induſtrious have been ſaddled with *two* taxes. Mr. Pitt prevented it. He made *one* ſerve, by applying the brewers ſcheme to the ſervice of the ſtate.

have been laid with leſs murmuring: it operates ſo inſenſibly, that the people, who at firſt were uneaſy, begin now to be reconciled to it; and it produces ſo conſiderable a revenue, that, to ſay no worſe, it is a great act of infidelity to government, in thoſe ſervants who ſtrive to render this tax odious, which it was neceſſary to impoſe, before they have contrived a better in its ſtead. "As for the exciſe on Cyder, they have acknowledged it to have been precipitate, impolitic, and inadequate; pretty heavy charges againſt a tax, which it has been uſual to contrive with deliberation, wiſdom, and a nice eſtimate of the ſufficiency of it, for the payments to which it is appropriated. They have confeſſed, by referring us to the act of William the third, that this tax is an extenſion of the exciſe laws; for that act taxes only the maker of Cyder from bought fruit; this taxes the maker in general. They would have it underſtood, that there is but little difference in this; though it is well known that the makers from bought fruit are very few in compariſon; and the makers in general are, the peers, gentlemen, freeholders, and farmers of ſix or ſeven counties. There is beſides a material difference between the maker of cyder from *bought* fruit, and the farmer who *grows* it. The maker from bought fruit can chuſe, whether he will buy fruit, and be a cyder-maker. He knows upon what terms and conditions he ſubjects himſelf to exciſe laws. Whereas the farmer, who grows it, is of courſe, and, without any choice of his own, become ſubject to exciſe laws, or he muſt forego the produce of his farm. It was with this attention to liberty and equity, that the duty upon beer and ale was made payable only by him who ſells it. Every man may brew as little as he pleaſes; whereas the apple-grower muſt make more

more cyder than for his own conſumption. The periſhable nature of his fruit leaves him no choice. It has been ſuggeſted, that this tax may create cyder-makers, who, by buying the apples, may exempt the farmer from the viſitation of exciſemen. A bleſſed effect indeed! The farmer of a cyder farm is to have the alternative, of either ſubjecting himſelf to an oppreſſion, to which no other farmers are ſubject, or of diſpoſing of his *periſhable* fruit to a monopolizing cyder-maker, who will be enabled by the terrors of this tax, and the mode of levying it, to bring the farmer to his own terms. The exciſe upon, and compoſition for, malt is no grievance, compared with this exciſe upon cyder. It is the maltſter's own free choice to ſubject himſelf to it. He is under no neceſſity to turn maltſter for the ſake of his barley; for the barley will not periſh immediately; and if the demand for it at home ſhould not anſwer his expectation, he has a chance of finding a demand for it abroad, and is encouraged to export it, by a bounty. Barley therefore is a marketable commodity; apples are not, till made into cyder. They are not fit for exportation, nor will they admit of delay in the ſale. The maltſter has another chance. He may convert his barley into ſpirits, and has in that caſe too the advantage of a premium for exportation. Cyder may be converted into ſpirits; but there is no premium for the exportation of that ſpecies of ſpirits. In what reſpect, therefore, is the tax on beer ſo odious and oppreſſive as the exciſe on cyder? The friends of the miniſtry cannot ſhew. Yet they never fail to mention the compoſition of five ſhillings *per* head, to exempt thoſe who make cyder for private conſumption, from the viſitation of exciſe officers. But is it the caſe of any man, who rents a cyder farm, that he makes

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no more cyder, than for private conſumption? We may judge from the quantities conſumed all over England, and the quantities exported, how ſmall the private conſumption of the farmer is, in proportion to the quantity of apples he grows. But to ſhew the futility of this argument more glaringly, let us ſuppoſe the growers of wheat to be made liable to an exciſe for their wheat: would it be a remedy adequate to the evil, or any conſolation to the farmers, to allow them a compoſition for the quantity of wheat conſumed in their own families? The champions of the adminiſtration then add an aſſertion of their own, that there is no reaſonable ground for the violent clamour made againſt the mode of collection, *unleſs cyder makers have a right to more liberty, than the makers of other liquors.* The anſwer is eaſy, with an appeal to truth and common ſenſe, that apple-growers have a right to enjoy as much liberty, as barley-growers, and that they are neceſſarily cyder-makers, becauſe they are apple-growers; whereas the barley-grower is not neceſſarily a maltſter, or a brewer. The reader ſees upon the whole, that this tax is a manifeſt *extenſion* of the exciſe laws, to perſons who were not ſubject to them before, and are by this law put upon a worſe footing, than their fellow ſubjects in other parts of the kingdom, to whom the exciſe laws do not yet extend:" and that it is in *every* manner, *more* odious, *more* cruel, and *more* oppreſſive, than the tax upon beer. It may likewiſe be added, that it is not adequate to the ſupplies wanted; whereas the tax upon beer, produces ſo great a revenue, as to become a real piece of national ſtrength. Which, therefore, is *moſt* ſerviceable to the ſtate, and *leaſt* grievous to the ſubject? The anſwer is too plain to be repeated here. However advantageous as the tax upon

beer

beer hath been found to be, and great as the ſervices are, which the ſtate hath derived from it; yet theſe *pretended* friends to the public welfare, and to liberty; theſe œconomiſts, who have ſunk the civil liſt ſo much in debt, *promiſed* to repeal this act. For that *promiſe*, they vainly imagined they could *purchaſe* popularity. But why have they not fulfilled their *promiſe?* The anſwer is this, *they cannot.* They find it too ſerviceable to the ſtate, and they have not *heads* to contrive a better. Yet with the moſt unparallelled effrontery, while they were hanging out the enſigns of friendſhip to their country, they declaimed againſt this tax (thinking thereby to wound Mr. Pitt's reputation, for ſince they have been in power they have had *nothing elſe* in view) the benefits of which they were receiving, and yet had not a better to offer in its ſtead: and at laſt, when they produced *their own* ways and means, they appeared in an EXCISE; the moſt odious, the moſt grievous, and the moſt oppreſſive that could be formed; and not only ſo, but the moſt partial, becauſe it affects England *only*, tho' Scotland is, in its proportionate degree, to reap the benefit. "Moſt of the counties in England make ſome cyder, though it is the peculiar produce of only ſix or ſeven; but Scotland makes none. It would have been too glaring an act of partiality, to have laid a general tax upon Great-Britain, and by an expreſs proviſo to have exempted Scotland from paying it. A wiſer and more decent expedient was hit upon; a heavy burden is laid on England, which ſhall not reach to Scotland; that happy land of Goſhen ſhall not touch the burden with one finger, and ſhall be exempted from all the plagues and vexations which fall upon her united ſiſter, both as to the load of the tax itſelf, and as to the oppreſſive mode of collection, which aggravates the burthen infinitely beyond the natural

natural weight of it. Indeed the Scotch nation had a right to this piece of partiality from their noble countryman, in compenſation for all the injury which his ambition has done them. They had a juſt claim to the affection of their fellow-ſubjects in the South, having behaved like Engliſhmen in the courſe of the war; and their behaviour would have compleated the union, and have extinguiſhed all difference between Engliſh and Scotch, had not his ambition unſeaſonably interpoſed, and excited jealouſies, which have put back the union for twenty years at leaſt."

The next charge which Mr. Pitt's enemies bring againſt him, is, his oppoſing the peace which lord Bute made, and notwithſtanding, would himſelf have made a *worſe*.* The terms on which Mr. Pitt

* "An argument which has been much urged in favour of the miniſter who made the peace, is "that it was *more advantageous* than that which Mr. Pitt *would* have made when he was in power." If conſiſtency could be expected where truth is deviated from, ſuch an apology would never have been made; for it, at once, cuts up by the roots the great pretence of merit in Lord Bute's undertaking to put an end to the war, becauſe no other body would; ſeeing it clearly proves that Mr. Pitt was very much diſpoſed to have made a peace if he could: And ſo far is true, that the peace which that great miniſter would have agreed to, was not the peace he himſelf wiſhed, and thought the ſituation and claims of this country were entitled to. He publicly declared in a certain aſſembly, where he might, if he could have been contradicted, that inſtead of courting a breach with Spain (which was alledged in proof of his love of war) he had rather riſked his reſponſibility by forbearance towards that haughty court; and inſtead of retarding a peace with France, he had, to preſume harmony at home, and to accelerate an end to the burdens of war, been over perſuaded by thoſe with whom he ſerved in the adminiſtration, to yield to conceſſions he could not approve, and which he hoped no miniſter would again venture to agreed to. Mr. Pitt is repreſented as the *inflexible* miniſter, whom no peace would content, becauſe he wiſhed for none: He is the *miniſter of war*; blood is his element; conqueſt his rage; and

Pitt would have made peace, have been already mentioned in the Review. The terms which lord Bute

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and battles his food! Yet to *eke* out the praiſe on lord Bute's peace, it is called *better* than Mr. Pitt's would have been. So that Mr. Pitt was ſtill more *pacific* than lord Bute; and not ſo attentive to the national intereſt in the terms he agreed to. How conſiſtent theſe!

It is indeed but *falſe* luſtre which a *foil* gives; and if it is the beſt thing that can be ſaid for the peace, that it is not the worſt that might have been made, or not quite ſo bad as another would have concluded, it is but a poor commendation; and a ſorry ſatisfaction for the blood and treaſure that have been expended to procure it. The aſſertion, however, that "the peace is more advantageous, than that Mr. Pitt would have made when in power," is only a ſtricture of faſhionable *fallacy*: A *relative advantage* may be a *real damage*: Many things that are *better* than others, are yet in themſelves very *bad*. To make a fair compariſon between Mr. Pitt's treaty and lord Bute's peace, the nation muſt be put into the ſame circumſtances, both of *coſt* and *conqueſt*, at the time of the one as of the other. For there may be *more acquired*, and yet *leſs gained*, when the account is fairly ballanced. The *moſt advantageous* terms may be the *leaſt adequate*, when all circumſtances are duly conſidered. Conditions that are *in themſelves* moſt lucrative, may be of the ſmalleſt profit, and the moſt *unſuitable*, when eſtimated by an equal rule of proproportion, and judged of by the true ſtandard of ſituation, capacity, and opportunity. If the late peace is brought to this teſt, it will be a hard taſk to prove the ſuperiority; and not very eaſy to demonſtrate the equality of the terms of it, to thoſe adhered to by Mr. Pitt, in the former negotiations.

The reaſon of Mr. Pitt's not *agreeing* to *farther conceſſions*, and of lord Bute's not *inſiſting* upon *greater advantages*, is to be found in their different characters, and the *oppoſite principles* by which they were led. The *one* could not be more eager to have *any*, than the *other* was deſirous to have a *good* peace. Mr. Pitt was anxious to relieve his proſperous but bleeding country from the burdens and hardſhips of a heavy, tho' ſucceſsful war: lord Bute was ſollicitous to reſcue his own unpopular and unſtable adminiſtration from the perils and dangers of diſtracted councils, difficult undertakings, and doubtful ſupport. The *great miniſter*, inſenſible to intereſt, but inſeparable from integrity, with his *patriot* principles, ſeconded by abilities, and ſuſtained by reputation, ſpread terror abroad, and diffuſed aſſurance at home: Conſcious of the ſtrength, and confident of the aſſiſtance of his country; tender of its force, but tenacious of its rights; truſt-

Bute obtained from the French, are given in the Review of his lordſhip's adminiſtration; together with

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ing to the juſtice of the cauſe, and encouraged by the experience of the vigour of England; had *firmneſs* to reſiſt the inſidious offers of an humbled enemy, and *courage* to deſpiſe the inſolent threats of a haughty court: Founded upon theſe pillars, his reſolution was bold, and his ſpirit unſkaken, *equally* to engage a formidable league, as to contend with a ſingle power; therefore he was not terrified to accept of inglorious or inadequate terms of peace; but, with magnanimous intrepidity, ſtaked his favour with the people, and ventured his influence with the prince, in timely breaking off the negociation with the French king, and adviſing, NOT a *precipitate rupture*, BUT a *categorical explanation* with the Spaniard; and his name is illuſtrated in the annals of fame, by the *pitiful* and *perſonal* reſentment of thoſe two crowns levelled at him, as the miniſter of this kingdom, in whom they dreaded the bravery of the nation. The *little minion* attached to power, and accuſtomed to arrogance, the ſlave of ambition, and mancipated to tyranny, feeling his own incapacity, and preſſed with his danger, without character and credit, deſtitute of the abilities, and deprived of the counſels, of which he had *rid* himſelf, and robbed the throne, proud of royal captivity; favouritiſm his foundation; corruption his reſource; deaf to the cries, and dead to the love of the public; purſued with the diſregard, and perſecuted with the deriſion of the people; the contempt of the wiſe, and the ſcorn of the witty; the prop of Jacobites, and the tool of Tories; a ſcourge of Whigs; an oppreſſor of liberty; intoxicated with the ſway of a court, but mortified with the diffidence of the common-wealth; generally hated, and almoſt univerſally diſliked; what *would* he, what *could* he do? Juſt what he did. Unequal to the charge he had *fondly* undertaken; too weak for one war, and cruſhed with the weight of a duplicate; he muſt reſign his poſt, or *reſpite* hoſtilities. His determination was according to his delight: he loved power, and therefore begged peace An indifferent one he knew he could ſoon, and without much conteſt make; and he durſt not venture a diſpute or delay for a better; ſo he *wrote* away the acquiſitions of the war, and what might have been the ſecurity of a peace; and with the blundering daſh of a pen diſhououred the crown, diſgraced himſelf, and diſcontented the nation.

The *principle* of this conduct was very bad, but it was ſenſible, and founded in experience. They are very ignorant who do not know the difference there is to a miniſter between peace and war. It is of importance even in arbitrary governments, but of irreſiſtible

with ſome account of the manner he treated our allies. But in order to be enabled to judge, whether lord Bute's peace is in many reſpects *better* and in no reſpect *worſe*, (for ſo the Scots expreſs it) than that which Mr. Pitt would have made, it is ne-

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irreſiſtible efficacy in this free country Government ſupports itſelf in time of peace, and miniſters have leſs hard work to do, and no extraordinary demands to make, conſequently they have leſs dependence upon the people. In time of war it is quite otherwiſe. There is not only exerciſe for the firſt rate abilities, but large ſupplies muſt be raiſed; and if the people are not ſatisfied with the conduct of affairs, and have confidence in adminiſtration, they will not give their money if their repreſentatives ſhould vote credit for it, and the machine will come to a ſtand. This has, in former times, produced changes in the miniſtry at critical ſeaſons, and lord Bute ſaw his danger. To ward it off by concluding a peace was his ſole ſtudy; *that* the object of his whole ſyſtem. Power, corruption, and art, ſupplied the place of ſound politics; and nothing that could by any device be removed, was ſuffered to obſtruct the neceſſary work of peace, if any way of *putting an end to a war* can be called by that comprehenſive name: neither the terms, the time, the manner, nor the means, were allowed to embarraſs, if the end aimed at could in any way be attained.

In this, as in other inſtances, we have a ſtrong proof how intimately the domeſtic and foreign affairs of a country are connected. The miniſter that purſues a bad ſyſtem at home, will very naturally, and muſt often neceſſarily adopt one that is erroneous abroad. As there is always an uniformity and conſiſtency in ſound politics, there muſt be ſome correſpondence in thoſe that are bad. The miniſter, for the ſake of his own purſuits at home, departed from the ſyſtem in which England was engaged, and ought to have purſued, with reſpect to foreign powers. If reverſing the *natural* and *approved* ſyſtem of a country, throwing off its beſt alliances, and wounding national faith and honour, is an offence, we know who may be charged with it. The circumſtances of perfidy and deceit attending the behaviour towards ſome of our allies, as well as the end for which they were treated in the manner they were, conſtitute matter of heavy imputation, more than ſufficient, if there had been nothing worſe, to render any miniſter, acceſſary to it, unworthy of that truſt, and deſerving of a much greater cenſure than being removed from his Sovereign's *preſence* and councils for ever."

neceſſary to mention a few of the articles of each, which will ſhew how very *widely* they differ, particularly with reſpect to advantage. It is not here intended to enquire into the merits of lord Bute's peace; for it is conſidered by the whole Engliſh nation, as infamous and inſecure, which numberleſs facts could be brought to prove: but only to ſhew that lord Bute RECEDED from ſome of the principal articles inſiſted upon by Mr. Pitt; and that conſequently, the different circumſtances of the nation conſidered, he *did not* make ſo *good* a peace as Mr. Pitt would have done.

Mr. PITT's negociation.

Mr. Pitt, and *all* the king's ſervants, inſiſted, "That the French ſhall abſtain from that particular fiſhery, on all the coaſts appertaining to Great-Britain, whether on the continent, or on the iſlands ſituated in the ſaid gulph of St. Lawrence; which fiſhery the proprietors only of the ſaid coaſts have conſtantly enjoyed, and always exerciſed, ſaving always the privilege granted by the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht."

Lord BUTE's peace.

Gives the French "The liberty to fiſh in the gulph of St. Lawrence, on condition that the ſubjects of France do not exerciſe the ſaid fiſhery, but at the diſtance of three leagues from all the coaſts belonging to Great-Britain, and fifteen leagues from the coaſts of the iſland of Cape Breton, together with the liberty of fiſhing and drying on a part of the coaſts of the iſland of Newfoundland."—If the French are as attentive to their own intereſts as we have ever found them to be, they will doubtleſs call this a grant of the WHOLE FISHERY.

Mr.

Mr. Pitt abſolutely refuſed to cede the iſland of Miquelon to the French; and the French miniſter told Mr. Stanley, "He would not inſiſt on it." To the ceſſion of the iſland of St. Peter ONLY *four indiſpenſible* conditions were annexed *. The ceſſion of the iſland of St. Peter, as well as ſome others, was not agreeable to Mr. Pitt's own inclination; for it is a fact, which even the *lying* partizans of the miniſtry cannot deny, that both HE and LORD TEMPLE, earneſtly conteſted for the WHOLE EXCLUSIVE FISHERY, which they ſaid, ought to be inſiſted upon. But in this, as in MANY other things, they were over-ruled.

The iſlands of St. Peter and Miquelon are both ceded to the French, in full right, without any one of the *four indiſpenſible* conditions. No Engliſh commiſſary is allowed to reſide there; our ſecurity is on the *preſent* French king's royal word; but not a ſyllable is mentioned of any engagement for his ſucceſſor.

Mr. Pitt inſiſted on keeping both Senegal and Goree, on the coaſt of Africa, "For that

Lord Bute wrote away the iſland of Goree, which is of the greateſt importance to France, as

* Theſe indiſpenſible conditions were, That France abſtain from fiſhing on the coaſt; that ſhe erect no fortification, or keep any military eſtabliſhment on the iſland; that an Engliſh commiſſary be allowed to reſide on it; and that Engliſh men of war be allowed to viſit it from time to time, to ſee that the above ſtipulations be obſerved.

Senegal

Senegal could not be ſecurely maintained without Goree;" and M. Buſſy "was authorized to conſent to the ceſſion."

Mr. Pitt poſitively refuſed to cede the iſland of St. Lucia to France. His negociation declares "the ceſſion by no means admiſſible."

Mr. Pitt treated the king of Pruſſia with efficacy and good faith. The anſwer to the French ultimatum, ſays, "As to what regards the *reſtitution* and evacuation of the conqueſts made by France on the king's allies in Germany, and particularly of Weſel, and other territories of the king of Pruſſia, his majeſty perſiſts in his demand relative to that ſubject, in the *ultimatum* of England, *viz.* that they ſhall be *reſtored* and it ſerves her as a ſecurity in the ſupply of negroes for the French Weſt-Indies.

Lord Bute ceded St. Lucia in full right to France. [St. Lucia is the principal and only valuable iſland of thoſe lately called neutral, which, as France hath recovered her loſt ſugar iſlands, muſt greatly add to the over-balance of power ſhe *before* had in the Weſt-Indies. In a word, it is of INFINITE importance to France.]

The Scotch miniſter both deceived and betrayed the king of Pruſſia. He firſt broke the faith of the nation, by refuſing the ſubſidy to that monarch. Then in the preliminary articles of the peace, he ſtipulated evacuation and *reſtoration*, with regard to the conqueſts made on all our allies, except the king of Pruſſia, for whom he ſtipulated EVACUATION *only*. The places belonging to the king of Pruſſia, of which the French

evacuated." The French having propoſed the keeping poſſeſſion of the countries belonging to the king of Pruſſia, Mr. Pitt returned this anſwer in writing, which was approved by *all* the king's miniſters: "I likewiſe return you as totally inadmiſſible, the memorial relative to the king of Pruſſia, as implying an attempt on the honour of Great-Britain, and the fidelity with which his majeſty will always fulfil his engagements."

French were in poſſeſſion, were Cleves, Gueldres, Weſel, &c. Thus lord Bute, inſtead of behaving to the king of Pruſſia with the good faith becoming an ally, acted like an open enemy to him; and left the French at full liberty to evacuate thoſe places, and all others which they held belonging to that monarch, *to whom they pleaſed.* And laſtly, he ſaid, the dominions of the king of Pruſſia were to be "SCRAMBLED FOR;" that was his low and vulgar phraſe. The French king declared, he conquered thoſe places for the empreſs queen, conſequently he muſt evacuate them to her. But the king of Pruſſia threatening, on that account, to carry the war into the Netherlands, the French king offered to *reſtore* thoſe places to him, if he would ſign a neutrality for the Auſtrian Netherlands, which the king of Pruſſia did. Thus France, not England, has the honour of reſtoring to the king of Pruſſia,

Pruſſia, his dominions. " The defenders of lord Bute were hired to vilify and traduce the king of Pruſſia, in the moſt ſcandalous manner, calling him by the infamous epithet of a *royal free-booter*, though he had been often ſtiled from the throne, ' A magnanimous prince, and a good ally of the crown.' They were prompted to maintain, that the bad faith practiſed towards him, was a duty to ourſelves, and juſtifiable by the law of nations. This was not all. The world is much abuſed, if there was not a correſpondence carried on with the court of Peterſburgh, in which the miniſtry of this country, ſaid, or inſinuated in very ſtrong terms, that we ſhould behold with concern, the late emperor of Ruſſia's withdrawing from the alliance, and recalling his troops from the aſſiſtance of the empreſs queen :— That this country did not wiſh, that the king of Pruſſia ſhould be aggrandized at the expence of

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of the Houſe of Auſtria; but would rather deſire to ſee his power revert to its primitive electoral ſtate."

Such is the very great difference in only a few articles of this boaſted compariſon. We will now proceed to ſome ſhort remarks, relative to the ſtate of affairs, at the two different periods. When Mr. Pitt's negociation was carrying on, the implacable empreſs of Ruſſia was alive, the affairs of the king of Pruſſia almoſt deſperate, and Heſſe, &c. in the hands of the enemy. Mr. Pitt, in order to redeem Heſſe, gave away Guadalupe. When lord Bute's negociation was carrying on, the Ruſſians were withdrawn from the alliance; the king of Pruſſia had only one power to contend with, over which he had a manifeſt aſcendency. On the contrary, the nation had incurred a debt of twelve millions, and a war with Spain. But by that ſum, and that meaſure, we had gained the iſlands of Martinico, St. Lucia, the Grenadilloes, Dominica, and St. Vincent, together with the Havannah, the key of the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies, nine Spaniſh ſhips of the line, ſeveral other rich ſhips, and an immenſe treaſure. The French were driven from Heſſe; why, therefore, did lord Bute give away *both* Guadalupe and Martinico? As to the war with Spain, the very little time it laſted, owing to the miniſter's determined reſolution of having a peace upon *any* terms, ſhewed how little we had to fear from the enmity of the Spaniards. And as to the war in Portugal, on which the tools of the miniſtry laid ſo great a ſtreſs, it employed 70 or 80,000 of the enemies forces; who, ſome time before the peace was ſettled, were utterly unable to proceed any further in their operations, owing to the impoſ-

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ſibility of acting in an enemy's country, very mountainous, in the face of that enemy. With regard to the increaſed debt, which is another point on which the miniſterial tools laid a great ſtreſs, we ought to conſider, that great advantages cannot be obtained without great expence; it would be as vain to imagine it, as to expect great victories without bloodſhed. In a word, from this TRUE ſtate of things, which every man knows, it is very plain, that Great Britain was in a *better* ſituation, and had a greater ſuperiority over her enemies, when lord Bute made peace, than when Mr. Pitt was in power; and notwithſtanding that, his lordſhip made a much *worſe* peace in ALL RESPECTS, conſidering the *additional advantages*, than Mr. Pitt would have done. Theſe facts are ſo very apparent and convincing, that they cannot to the meaneſt underſtanding, need any further explanation.

Theſe are the principal charges which the enemies of Mr. Pitt have brought againſt his conduct. The candid and impartial public will from hence ſee, how little truth there is in them; and thereby be enabled to judge of any other* tales, propagated

* As Mr. Pitt has not thought fit to make any kind of reply to the infamous load of ſcurrility and abuſe, which has been heaped upon him, upon a falſe ſuppoſition, that he behaved in the late negotiation with inſolence and indignity to his ſovereign; we will juſt mention one fact, very well known even to Mr. George Grenville himſelf, which will ſufficiently convince the reader how groundleſs as well as wicked thoſe reports were. On the Wedneſday ſubſequent to the laſt conference with which his majeſty honoured Mr. Pitt, lord Temple and Mr. Pitt went to St. James's, to pay their duty to his majeſty, they were both received in the moſt gracious manner; and his majeſty, in the moſt obliging terms, ſaid to Mr. Pitt, "*I hope, Sir, you have not ſuffered by ſtanding ſo long on Monday.*" Would his majeſty have been ſo complaiſant to Mr. Pitt, if he had behaved with that inſolence which the defenders of Mr. George Grenville have repeatedly repreſented?——In the ſame manner did theſe tools of adminiſtration ſay he treated Mr. Allen of Bath. The lies which they propagated relative to that affair, at length forced

by a ſet of men who are aſſiduous in all attempts to deceive them; who envy the high reputation in which he ſtands with his countrymen; and who, becauſe they cannot efface the glories of his adminiſtration, and the importance of his ſervices, have had recourſe to the ſcandalous practice of publiſhing the groſſeſt falſehoods, together with the moſt infamous ſlanders, ſcurrilities, and abuſe, that it was poſſible for the human mind to invent. It may therefore be proper to caution the public, not to precipitately give credit to the aſſertions occaſionally made by the leaders and tools of a party, who are enemies to Mr. Pitt, becauſe he ſerved his country; and who joined the Scottiſh miniſter, in order to ſhare in the *plunder* of it. "His enemies are numerous; for many men he outſhone; of many he retrieved the blunders; of ſome he expoſed the crimes. He courted none, but thoſe who would ſerve their country. He neither took bribes, nor gave them. He was inacceſſible to the lazy, the profligate, the intereſted, and the proud. He demoliſhed the power of France, which the Jacobities had ſaved at Utrecht, and which the Tories have reſtored by the late peace. He would have reduced Spain, and burſt the perfidious family-compact, if an ignorant but preſumptuous favourite had not preferred his own ſtability at court to the ſecurity of Great-Britain and Europe; and he retired to a private life, when he found that the will of an upſtart minion was more regarded than the preſent honour and future ſalvation of England. He bluſhed for his countrymen, but he ſcorned to bribe them. They wiſhed for nothing but to be bribed, ſold their poſterity for a meſs of Scotch porridge, and put on the livery of the prime miniſter.

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forced out the *real* letters. The public were then undeceived, and Mr. Pitt ſhone the brighter from having been ſo ſcandalouſly abuſed, while his enemies, if poſſible, became more odious.

Hence

Hence the torrents of abuſe on Mr. Pitt from men

" Whoſe ſons ſhall bluſh their fathers were his foes:"

Hence their daily feeble and impotent attempts to pick flaws in his virtues, which blaze the brighter by being oppoſed to the trifling blemiſhes, which theſe curious but malignant ſearchers can with much microſcopic ſpite diſcover. If ſuch a man as Mr. Pitt is not without faults, a generous nature would weep over them: but it is *feminine* malice which thinks, by publiſhing or by whiſpering foibles, to extinguiſh the memory of his heroic ſervices. His enemies are conſcious, that unleſs he is depreſſed, they can never ſhine. Convict *him* of haughtineſs, and the theatric empty bombaſt and inſolence of the favourite may paſs for condeſcenſion and affability. What pity that they cannot prove that Mr. Pitt is a blockhead! how many of our miniſters would inſtantly become wits! Come, ye ſlanderers, ſtick at nothing: accuſe him of all the crimes of your patrons; it is the only way of white-waſhing the latter. Swear he has thirty thouſand pounds a year in long annuities; that he got immenſe ſums by contracts in Germany; that the exciſe on cyder was his ſcheme; that while he was ſecretary of ſtate he committed members of parliament to cloſe impriſonment; that he begged a peace, and b—— approbation of it; that he loaded the civil liſt with debts by a profuſion of penſions; that he inſulted the ſtaunchеſt friends of the houſe of Hanover; that he made notorious Jacobites privy counſellors; that he debarred the nobility from all acceſs to their ſovereign: and that, in the midſt of his inſolence, he was ſeized with a panic and ran away to Harrowgate."

FINIS.